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NOTES
PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS: THE RETURN OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Alleging that the state had violated HEW regulations governing
distribution of welfare benefits under the Aid to the Aged, Blind and
Disabled (AABD) program,' plaintiff brought suit in federal district
court against the director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid.
Injunctive relief and a retroactive award of benefits were sought, and
the award of both by the district court was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.2 To resolve the conflict between circuits
over the validity of a retroactive payment award, 3 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the eleventh amendment prohibits retroactive relief against a state treasury. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
When the eleventh amendment 4 was adopted in 1789, its purpose
was to overrule the controversial decision of Chisholm v. Georgia,5
which had upheld federal jurisdiction over a suit by a South Carolina
citizen against the state of Georgia. Thus restored was the state's
sovereign immunity from suit by citizens of another state which
Chisholm had declared abrogated by the grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in article III, section 2 of the Constitution. Hans v.
Louisiana,7 decided some years after the amendment's passage, held
that the amendment not only restored the immunity lost in Chisholm
but also denied jurisdiction to the federal courts over suits against a
state even when brought by one of its own citizens. Despite criticism
of the Hans construction of the amendment,' its continuing vitality
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1935). The regulation violated was 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973),
setting maximum time standards for processing applications.
2. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
3. The holding of Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972) was in conflict
with the Seventh Circuit's holding in the instant case.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
foreign state."
5. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
6. Id. at 463-66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . between a State and Citizens of another State.
7. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
8. See Employees of Dep't of Publ. Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279,
298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state hospital employees held to be barred by
eleventh amendment from recovering overtime payments under Fair Labor Standards
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insures that no federal court will entertain a direct suit against an
unconsenting state.
Nevertheless, the practice of instituting private suits against
state officials in their official capacities has often resulted in circumvention of the eleventh amendment bar. While Chief Justice Marshall was willing, in Osborn v.Bank of the United States,' to limit
the amendment's effect to suits against states only when they were
parties, subsequent decisions refused to find jurisdiction over certain
actions when state officials were dummy defendants. 0 The type of
relief sought also influenced the Court in deciding whether to bar
certain actions: federal courts could enjoin prospective illegal actions
by state officials," but they were not the appropriate forum to reach
money or property already in the state's possession. 2
The passage of the fourteenth amendment creating new federal
rights limiting state actions complicated the question of when the
eleventh amendment should be applied. In allowing a preliminary
injunction against the Attorney General of Minnesota to stand, Ex
parte Young 3 showed a limited preference for the fourteenth amendment over the eleventh and definitively established the federal judicial power to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional
statutes. The Court found the official's proposed conduct to be sufficient state action to invoke the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but held that the suit to enjoin that action was not
within the eleventh amendment restriction on federal jurisdiction.
Thus, although Ex parte Young did not directly hold that the fourteenth amendment limited the eleventh amendment, by allowing
injunctive relief against state officials, the decision has enabled federal courts to act as a check upon the states in many instances." Left
Act). The constitutional protection extends only to states and state instrumentalities.
It does not apply to actions against officials for which they would be personally liable.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Nor does it apply to actions against political
subdivisions such as counties or municipalities. Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
10. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883);
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
11. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (suit to restrain state
officials from acts alleged violative of vested contract rights held not forbidden by
eleventh amendment).
12. See, e.g., Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896): "[N]o injunction can be
issued against officers of a State, to restrain or control the use of property already in
the possession of the State, or money in its treasury when the suit is commenced.
13. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
14. The Court emphasized that "the use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the author-
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unchanged by the decision, however, were the earlier decisions that
the eleventh amendment precludes tampering with property already
possessed by the state. Thus, for example, if not barred by the Tax
Injunction Act,' 5 a corporation may sue in federal court to enjoin the
revenue commissioner of a state from collecting illegal taxes.'" Nevertheless, recovery from a state treasury is not permitted, for once taxes
are in the state's coffers, a federal court will not entertain a suit for
their recovery."
Successful invocation of the eleventh amendment has been rare
in recent years. The applicability of the amendment has been ignored
or avoided by a finding of the state's consent to suit.'" This led
commentators to predict that the eleventh amendment would soon
join the ninth and tenth amendments in constitutional limbo," and
the Supreme Court's affirmance without comment of a number of
cases subject to eleventh amendment objections gave credence to
these predictions."0
In the instant case, the Seventh Circuit characterized the demand for past benefits as one for restitution rather than damages,
and therefore not within the eleventh amendment prohibition.' The
ity of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity." Id. at 159. Obviously, the doctrine does affect states in their governmental capacities. It is patently fictitious, and the fiction has led to a quagmire of legal inconsistency. However, many of the major innovations of the Warren Court would have been
impossible without the Young rule. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The
Ex parte Young rule has been called "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." C. WIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 186 (1970).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948).
16. See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
17. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (eleventh amendment
barred suit for refund of allegedly illegally collected taxes). Ford was heavily relied on
in the instant case.
18. See Comment, 33 UNIV. CHI. L. Rzv. 331 (1966). No state won an eleventh
amendment argument at the Supreme Court level between Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Comni'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946) and Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
19. See Comment, 33 UNIV. CI. L. REv. 331 (1966). The prediction was based on
the implied waiver implications in the decision of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184 (1964). See also Cullison, Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of
the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 1 (1967), suggesting an interpretation which would eliminate the Hans rule in federal question cases.
20. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972);
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v.
Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). None of these
cases discussed the eleventh amendment issue. All but Shapiro were summary affirmances.
21. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973). For a comparison of the case
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United States Supreme Court, however, refused to accept such a
distinction,22 pointing out that restitution, like damages, would be
paid from the state treasury to compensate for a past official breach
of duty, and concluded that both would therefore be outside the Ex
parte Young exception for suits seeking prospective relief against a
state. While prospective relief might affect a state treasury, the Court
considered it to be a "permissible ancillary effect" resulting from a
change in the manner a state official conducts his duties and not from
a direct order by a federal court to pay out funds from the state
23
treasury.1
The distinction between a direct effect and a "permissible ancillary effect" on the state treasury seems artificial. However, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is itself artificial and its limitations can only
be explained in terms of federal-state relationships. A judgment for
damages against a state is equivalent to a direct order to a state
legislature to approprite funds for a specific purpose. For a federal
court to order such a remedy would do violence to our traditional
notions of comity. While an order directed to a state functionary is
relatively easy to enforce through the contempt power, a court would
justifiably wish to avoid, in all but the most extreme cases, the serious questions of federal-state comity which would be raised if it punished a state legislative body for contempt.24 Limiting suits in federal
courts to those seeking prospective relief is an accomodation between
with the conflicting Second Circuit decision of Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d
Cir. 1972), see Note, 21 KAN. L. REV. 429 (1974).
22. 415 U.S. at 668. The eleventh amendment itself makes no distinction between
suits at law and suits in equity. Furthermore, the remedy refused in the tax repayment
cases of the 1940's could easily be characterized as restitution. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). The Seventh Circuit in the instant case
may have been unwilling to leave the protection of individual rights to state courts
since in some instances state courts have been known to be reluctant to enforce federal
rights. For an extreme example, see NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 (1959), in which
the Alabama supreme court was overturned by the Supreme Court for reissuing a
contempt citation which the Supreme Court had previously voided.
23. While prospective injunctions can often have a greater iffect on the state
treasury than retrospective relief, in the former situation the state at least theoretically
has the option of discontinuing the program entirely. Whether such an option contributes meaningfully to harmonious federal-state relationships may be debatable, but its
availability should be considered.
24. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 219 (1965): "When
a court presents its own legislative and executive authorities with a judgment to be
paid, these authorities may see fit not to pay it if there are good enough reasons. But
the judgment of a federal court against a state treasury gives warrant to and imposes
perhaps a duty on the President of the United States to enforce the court's decree; it
has the makings of a constitutional crisis."
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the eleventh amendment, which emphasizes the state's independence, and the fourteenth amendment, which emphasizes federal
protection against state abuse of individual rights. The decision in
the instant case maintains this accomodation.
Of course, the eleventh amendment does not prohibit federal
court jurisdiction when the state has consented to suit. The alternative holding of the Seventh Circuit in the instant case was that
Illinois had waived its immunity from suit by accepting federal
matching funds to administer the AABD program. 5 Following the
6
approach of Parden v. Terminal Railway,"
the court reasoned that
Illinois had left the sphere that was exclusively its own and had
thereby constructively consented to suit in federal court. The Supreme Court distinguished Parden" and continued:
Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with
the surrender of constitutional rights. . . . [W]e will find
waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by
such overwhelming implications from the text as leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.' 5
This approach, which strongly resembles the dissent in Parden,
demands that if Congress wishes to make waiver of eleventh amendment immunity a requirement for participation in a federal-state
program, it must impose the requirement in sufficiently clear language to leave the state with no reasonable doubt that it has waived
its immunity. Eleventh amendment immunity is viewed by the Court
as being no different from other constitutional rights, the waiver of
which will not be implied. 9
25. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1973).
26. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
27. The distinction was on the basis of a sue-and-be-sued clause in the specific
congressional enactment involved in Parden.Public aid recipients, on the other hand,
must sue under the general provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). See Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). If the dissenters' reasoning in the instant case had been
adopted, the result would have been to write a constructive consent to private suit into
every state utilization of federal matching funds. See 415 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Given the massive use of federal funds in virtually all areas of state
government, the eleventh amendment would then have only historical interest.
28. 415 U.S. at 673 (citation omitted). See also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 199 (1964) (White, J., dissenting): "A decent respect for the normally preferred
position of constitutional rights dictates that if Congress decides to exercise its power
to condition privileges within its control on the forfeiture of constitutional rights its
intention to do so should appear with unmistakable clarity."
29. Strict requirements for waiver of individual constitutional rights have existed
for some time. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The majority in Edelman determined that abrogation of the eleventh amendment by the federal courts is not an acceptable method
of coping with state violation of a Congressional directive. Congress,
if it so desires, has the power to tie waiver of the amendment's bar
to acceptance of federal funds." There may be shortcomings with the
majority's approach, as Justice Marshall noted in dissent:
Without a retroactive-payment remedy, we are indeed faced with
'the spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly, defying federal law
and thereby depriving welfare recipients of the financial assistance Congress thought it was giving them.'
Nevertheless, the decision to leave this aspect of the delicate balancing process between private rights and federal-state comity to Congress is wise. By placing the onus upon Congress to determine when
a state must submit to suit in federal court, flexibility is afforded to
evaluate, in light of potential strains on the federal system, the importance of the private interest at stake and the extent it will be
infringed. If the Edelman dissenters' fears prove to be well founded,
Congress is at liberty to remedy the problem by including appropriate
provisions in its welfare legislation.
Robert Emerson Eatman, Jr.
GROWTH RESTRICTION v. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PETALUMA PLAN

Petaluma, a suburban California community experiencing rapid
growth, implemented a five year land-use program which restricted
30. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
The commission was formed under a compact authorized by Congress. The authorization provided that the commission would have authority to sue and be sued. The Court
held that formation of the commission waived the states' constitutional immunity. The
Court may reach a different result in an appropriate case if an individual constitutional
right, rather than a statutory right, is involved. Edelman was a 5-4 decision. Perhaps
the Court may distinguish the case if the argument that individual constitutional
rights should stand on equal footing with those of a state prevails. See Louisiana State
Bd. of Education v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1964): "The time may even have
come when it would be well to admit the realities, face up to the fact that in these
actions against a state agency or public official the party at interest is the State, and
hold that the Eleventh Amendment does not contemplate a suit based on state action
contrary to the United States Constitution."
31. 415 U.S. at 692 (Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The two Justices placed a high value on the deterrent effect of the retroactive remedy.
Their views on the necessity of keeping a tight rein on state action are analogous to
those expressed in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The majority, on the
other hand, seems willing to assume good faith administration on the part of the state,
and consequently believes the deterrent not worth the cost. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).

